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Abstract—This paper is concerned with a system of
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations coupled with an autonomous
dynamical system. The mathematical system arises in the differential
game formulation of political economy models as an inﬁnite-horizon
continuous-time differential game with discounted instantaneous
payoff rates and continuously and discretely varying state variables.
The existence of a weak solution of the PDE system is proven and
a computational scheme of approximate solution is developed for a
class of such systems. A model of democratization is mathematically
analyzed as an illustration of application.
Keywords—Differential games, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equations, inﬁnite horizon, political-economy models.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN this paper we study a system of semilinear ﬁrst orderpartial differential equations in the form
λwji (x) = F (x) · ∇xwji (x) + gji (x, φ∗)
+
m∑
μ=1
qjμ (x, φ
∗)wμi
(1)
for j = 1, . . . ,m, i = 1, . . . , n, where
x ≡ (x1 (t) , . . . , xd (t)) ∈ Rd
is subjected to the dynamical system
dxk/dt = Fk (x1, . . . , xd) , k = 1, . . . , d, (2)
and φ∗ ≡ (φ∗ji) is a solution of the maximization problem
φ∗i = argmax
φji∈Xji(φ∗jıˆ)
{
gji
(
x, φji, φ
∗
jıˆ
)
+
∑m
μ=1 qjμ
(
x, φji, φ
∗
jıˆ
)
wμi
}
.
(3)
Here, for each j, i, φji is a (possibly mixed) strategy in
a set of strategies Xji
(
φjıˆ
)
which may depend on other
players’ strategies φjıˆ ≡
(
φj1, . . . , φji−1, φji+1, . . . , φjn
)
.
The main assumptions are that the autonomous dynamic
system (2) has a global attractor x¯ in a bounded domain
Ω ⊂ Rd, and that the maximization problem (3) has a solution
φ∗ ≡ φ∗ (x,w) which is piecewise continuously differentiable
in (x,w). The goal of this paper is to prove the existence of a
solution (x (t) , w∗ (t) , φ∗ (t)) for any x (0) ∈ Ω under certain
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general conditions, and to develop a computation scheme for
approximating solutions.
This system arises in inﬁnite-horizon differential games
with continuously varying state variables and discretely
varying modes, where i ∈ {1, . . . , n} represents the players,
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} represents the modes of the system, x =
(x1, . . . , xd) ∈ Rd represents the continuously varying state
variables, φ = (φ1, . . . , φn) is the strategy proﬁle of the
players, qjμ is the transition rate between two modes, gji is
the instantaneous payoff rate for player i in mode j, λ is
the discount rate in the inﬁnite-horizon accumulated payoff,
and wji is related to the value function for player i in mode
j. In the game-theoretic framework there is a set of players,
each possessing a set of available strategies and uses them
to gain the best beneﬁt. In the meantime there is a number
of state variables governed by a dynamical system deﬁned by
a system of differential equations, and the system switches
among modes according to the rule of game. For example, in
modeling the political changes in a society, players are major
social groups, continuously-varying quantities are those that
characterize the quantitative features of the society, such as
the size and wealth of the population, rates of production, and
incomes of social groups, and modes specify who is in power
and whether the state is peaceful. Changes of these quantities
are caused by the players’ strategies. In an inﬁnite-horizon
game, players are concerned not only with their immediate
beneﬁts but also with their accumulated beneﬁts in the entire
future. A popular form is the discounted total payoff in the
form
Ui (t) = E
t
i
∫ ∞
t
e−λ(τ−t)Πi (τ , x (τ) , σ (τ) , φ (τ)) dτ,
where λ > 0 is a constant, Πi is the instantaneous rate
of change of payoff, and Eti is the expectation operator
conditional to the players’ available information at time t. The
expectation operator acts through the probability of the mode.
Let pj (t) = Pr (σ (t) = σj) be the projected probability of
the system in mode σj at time t for j = 1, . . . ,m, and
let gji (t, x, φ) denote Πi (t, x, σj , φ) for i = 1, . . . , n and
j = 1, . . . ,m. Then the expectation of the instantaneous
payoff rate is the sum
E
t
iΠi (t, x, σ, φ) =
m∑
j=1
pj (t) gji (t, x, φ)
≡ 〈p (t) , gi (t, x, φ)〉 ,
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where
p (t) = (p1 (t) , . . . , pm (t)) ,
gi (t, x, φ) = (gji (t, x, φ) , . . . , gmi (t, x, φ)) ,
and 〈·, ·〉 is the dot product in Rm. In terms of these functions
we can write the expected accumulated total discounted payoff
for player i as
Ui (t, φ) =
∫ ∞
t
e−λ(τ−t) 〈p (τ) , gi (τ , x (τ) , φ (τ))〉 dτ. (4)
Typically, the continuously-varying dynamic state variable
x (t) = (x1 (t) , . . . , xd (t)) is governed by a system of
differential equations in the form
dxk/dt = ϕk (t, x (t) , σ (t) , φ (t)) , k = 1, . . . , d. (5)
Let
fjk (t, x, φ) = ϕk (t, x, σj , φ) .
The equations can be written in the matrix form
dx/dt = p (t)F (t, x (t) , φ (t)) (6)
where F (t, x, u) = (fjk (t, x, u)) is an m × d matrix.
The change of modes are characterized by the varying of
probabilities p1 (t), . . . , pj (t). Suppose the mode σ (t)
evolves as a continuous-time stochastic process
Pr (σ (t+Δt) = σν |σ (t) = σμ, x (τ) , u (τ) , τ ≤ t)
= δμν + qμνΔt+ o (Δt) ,
(7)
where δμν is the Kronecker delta, and qμν , μ, ν ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
is the transition rate from state σμ to state σν . These quantities
satisfy qμν ≥ 0 for μ 
= ν and
∑m
ν=1 qμν = 0 for each μ.
In general qμν depends on t, x and u. Thus p (t) evolves
according to the differential equation
dp/dt = p (t)Q (t, x (t) , u (t)) (8)
where Q = (qμν)m×m is the transition matrix.
At any moment, t, each player chooses its strategy
{φi (τ) , τ ≥ t} to maximize its accumulated payoff Ui (t;φ)
deﬁned by (4). The result is an equilibrium at which the
inequality
Ui (t;φ
∗) ≥ Ui
(
t;
(
φji, φ
∗
jıˆ
))
(9)
hold for all i = 1, . . . , n, φji ∈ Xji
(
t, φ∗jıˆ
)
and j = 1, . . . ,m,
where Xji
(
t, φ∗jıˆ
)
is the set of available strategies of player i
given that other players follow the strategy
φ∗jıˆ =
(
φ∗j1, . . . , φ
∗
ji−1, φ
∗
ji+1, . . . , φ
∗
jn
)
.
Depending on the rule of game the equilibrium φ∗ may be a
Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium, or of other types.
The key to solve a differential game model is to determine the
maximizing strategies φ∗ji. Once the strategies are chosen by
all the players, the variables x (τ) and p (τ) are completely
determined for τ ≥ t by (6), (8) and their initial values x (t),
p (t), respectively.
Equations (1) and (3) are derived from the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations formulation of the
differential game. Deﬁne the value function Vi (t, x, y) by
Vi (t, x, y) =
∫ ∞
t
e−λτ 〈p (τ) , gi (τ , x (τ) , φ∗ (τ))〉 dτ
where x (τ), p (τ) are solutions of (6) and (8) with the
initial values x (t) = x, p (t) = y, and φ∗ =
(
φ∗ji
)
m×d
is the maximizing strategy proﬁle that satisﬁes (9). The
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations for Vi (t, x, y) is
−∂tVi (t, x, y)
= max
φji∈Xji(φ∗jıˆ),
j=1,...,m
m∑
j=1
yj
{
e−λtgji
(
t, x, φji, φ
∗
jıˆ
)
+ Fj
(
t, x, φji, φ
∗
jıˆ
)
∂xVi +Qj
(
t, x, φji, φ
∗
jıˆ
)
∂yVi
}
(10)
where
∂xVi = (∂x1Vi, . . . , ∂xdVi)
T
,
∂yVi = (∂y1Vi, . . . , ∂ymVi)
T
are both column vectors, Fj and Qj are the jth rows
of matrices F and Q, respectively. If the value function
Vi (t, x, y) can be solved together with the strategy proﬁle φ∗,
the dynamical system (6)–(8) can be solved for any initial
values. However, in general, the partial differential equation
(10) is difﬁcult to solve because it is highly nonlinear. The
system (1)-(3) is a special case where the functions ϕk,
k = 1, . . . , d in (5) are independent of the mode σ. In this
case the variable y can be eliminated from (10) since x (τ) is
independent of p (τ) and the matrix F (t, x, φ) has identical
rows. Furthermore, since System (8) is linear, its solution p (τ)
is linear with respect to its initial value, y. Thus the value
function Vi (t, x, y) is also linear in y and can be written in
the form Vi (t, x, y) = 〈y,Wi (t, x)〉 where Wi = ∂yVi. Note
that the components of y are nonnegative since they are the
probability distributions, (10) can be written in the form
−∂tWji (t, x) = max
φji∈Xji(φ∗jıˆ)
{
e−λtgji
(
t, x, φji, φ
∗
jıˆ
)
+F
(
t, x, φji, φ
∗
jıˆ
)
∂xWji (t, x)
+ Qj
(
t, x, φji, φ
∗
jıˆ
)
Wi (t, x)
}
(11)
for j = 1, . . . ,m, i = 1, . . . , n. We next observe that in
the autonomous case where functions gji, F , and Q are
independent of t, Ui (t;φ∗) deﬁned in (4) is also independent
of t. This means eλtWi (t, x) is independent of t. We denote
it as wi (x). If, in addition, F is independent of φ, then by
(11), the components of wi (x) satisfy the equations
λwji (x) = F (x) · ∂xwji (x)
+ max
φji∈Xji(φ∗jıˆ)
{
gji
(
x, φji, φ
∗
jıˆ
)
+Qj
(
x, φji, φ
∗
jıˆ
)
wi (x)
}
,
(12)
for j = 1, . . . ,m, i = 1, . . . , n, where “·” is the dot product
in Rd. This is the same as (1) and (3), while (5) with ϕk
independent of σ and φ is the same as (2).
Problem (1)–(3) is semilinear and therefore is easier
to analyze then the general problem (6), (8) and (10).
However, there is no results on the existence of solution
and computation of the solution in the current literature.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations for two-player zero
sum games have been widely used in early works on
differential games [6], [8], [9], [20]-[22]. However, the general
n equation system cannot be treated using the ordinary
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method of characteristics. There are two obstacles. One is that
the boundary condition is not given on a non-characteristic
manifold, but at an equilibrium point x¯ which is a zero of F .
This is because the values of wji are unknown for x ∈ Ω, and
in the general case its value can be determined by solving (12)
only at the equilibrium point x¯ together with the maximization
problem
maximize
φi∈Xi(φ∗−i)
gji
(
x, φi, φ
∗
−i
)
+Qj
(
x, φi, φ
∗
−i
)
wi (x) , (13)
for i = 1, . . . , n. Another obstacle is that the solution
(x,wi) → φ∗ of (13) is generally discontinuous. Thus the
right-hand side of (12) is generally discontinuous on (x,wi).
To overcome these difﬁculties, we use the Stable Manifold
Theorem to obtain a unique solution in a small neighborhood
of the equilibrium (x¯, w¯), and then use a ﬁxed point approach
to obtain the existence of the weak solution. This approach
also leads to an approximation scheme for the solution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we prove
the existence of a weak solution and develop a computation
scheme for constructing approximate solutions for problem
(1)–(3) under Hypothesis (H) below. In Section III, we use
the results to analyze a democratization model proposed in
[12] as an illustration of application. A numerical example is
also given at the end of Section III to explain the general
computation scheme. In Appendix, we give a proof of a
technical lemma used in Section III.
II. EXISTENCE AND COMPUTATION OF SOLUTION
In this section, we prove the existence of solution to (1)-(3)
and develop a computation scheme of the solution under the
following conditions.
Hypothesis (H):
1) Functions Fk for k = 1, . . . , d and gji, qjμ for i =
1, . . . , n and j, μ = 1, . . . ,m are C1 functions of their
arguments.
2) Ω ⊂ Rd is a bounded domain, with a C1 boundary ∂Ω.
Also there is x¯ ∈ Ω such that it is the only solution to
the equation F (x) = 0 and all the eigenvalues of the
Jacobi matrix DxF (x¯) are negative or complex with
negative real part. Furthermore x¯ is the global attractor
of the differential equation (2) in Ω.
3) The solution φ∗ of problem (3) exists and is piecewise
constant in D = Ω × Rm. Speciﬁcally, for each i =
1, . . . , n there are subdomains {Di1, . . . , DiNi} such
that each Dil is open and connected, Dil ∩ Dil′ = ∅
whenever l 
= l′, D =
N⋃
l=1
Dil, where the upper bar
indicates the closure, and φ∗i is constant in each Dil for
l = 1, . . . , Ni.
4) Problem
λw¯ji = gji (x¯, φ
∗ (x¯, w¯i)) +
m∑
μ=1
qjμ (x¯, φ
∗ (x¯, w¯i)) w¯μi,
(14)
for j = 1, . . . ,m, i = 1, . . . , n, has a solution (w¯ji)
such that (x¯, w¯i) ∈ Dil for some Dil.
Since the system involves discontinuous functions, we solve
it in the weak sense. A weak solution {w, φ∗} of (1)-(3) is
deﬁned by
Deﬁnition 1: We say {w, φ} is a weak solution of (1)–(3)
if for each i = 1, . . . , n, wi ∈ L2 (Ω;Rm), F (x) ∂xwi ∈
L2 (Ω;Rm), and the equation∫
Ω
〈v, gi (x, φ∗ (x,wi)) + F (x) ∂xwi
−λwi +Q (x, φ∗ (x,wi))wi〉 dx = 0
holds true for any v ∈ L2 (Ω;Rm), and wi (x¯) = w¯i.
A. Existence of Solution
The following theorem ensures the existence of a weak
solution.
Theorem 1: Suppose (H) holds. Then Problem (1)–(3) has
a solution {w∗i (x) , φ∗ (x)} for any x ∈ Ω, i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof: We ﬁx an i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since φ∗ (x, z) is
piecewise constant in Ω×Rm, for any ε > 0, we can construct
a smooth approximation φ∗ε of φ
∗ such that φ∗ε is a C
1 function
in Ω × Rm for each ε > 0, φ∗ε (x, z) = φ∗ (x, z) in Dεil for
any Dil, where
Dεil = {(x,wi) ∈ Dil, dist ((x,wi) , ∂Dil) > ε} ,
and φ∗ε is uniformly bounded. Let g
∗
ji,ε and q
∗
ji,ε denote the
functions
g∗ji,ε (x, z) = gji (x, φ
∗
ε (x, z)) , q
∗
ji,ε (x, z) = qji (x, φ
∗
ε (x, z))
for (x, z) ∈ Ω× Rm. Then the equation
λzji = g
∗
ji,ε (x¯, zi) +
m∑
μ=1
q∗jμ,ε (x¯, zi) zμi
has the same solution w¯ji if ε is sufﬁciently small such that
(x¯, w¯i) ∈ Dεil for each i. Let x0 ∈ Ω and let x (s) be the
solution of (2) with the initial value x (0) = x0 ∈ Ω. The
characteristic equations for (1) with gji (x, φ∗ (x,wi)) and
qjμ (x, φ
∗ (x,wi)) replaced by g∗ji,ε (x,wi) and q
∗
ji,ε (x,wi),
respectively, are
dx/ds = F (x) , x (0) = x0;
dzji/ds = λzji − g∗ji,ε (x (s) , zi)
−∑mμ=1 q∗jμ,ε (x (s) , zi) zμi,
lims→∞ zji (s) = w¯ji.
(15)
We show that this problem has a unique solution.
We ﬁrst observe that the equation for x is independent of
zji. Since F ∈ C1 (Ω), there is a unique solution for any
x0 ∈ Ω. Also, since x¯ is the global attractor of (2) in Ω,
it follows that lims→∞ x (s) = x¯. We show that (15) has a
solution in a neighborhood of (x¯, w¯). Note that system (15) is
autonomous and has (x¯, w¯i) as an isolated equilibrium. Since
φ∗ε is constant in D
ε
il, the Jacobian matrix Ji,ε (x¯, w¯i) = (Akl)
of the functions on the right-hand sides of the differential
equations in (15) at the equilibrium (x¯, w¯i) has the entries
A11 = DxF (x¯) , A12 = 0,
A21 = −Dxg∗i,ε (x¯, w¯i)−DxQ∗ε (x¯, w¯i) w¯i,
A22 = λI −Q∗ε (x¯, w¯i) ,
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where g∗i,ε (x,wi) =
(
g∗ji,ε (x,wi)
)m
j=1
, Q∗ε (x,wi) =(
q∗jμ,ε (x,wi)
)
m×m, and I is the m × m identity matrix.
Clearly the eigenvalues of Ji,ε (x¯, w¯i) are the eigenvalues of
DxF (x¯) and the eigenvalues of λI − Q∗ε (x¯, w¯i) combined.
Note that the off-diagonal entries of Q∗ε (x¯, w¯i) are all
nonnegative, and the sum of each row of Q∗ε (x¯, w¯i) is
zero. Therefore by the Perron–Frobenius Theorem the largest
eigenvalue of Q∗ε (x¯, w¯i) is zero and all other eigenvalues
are either negative or complex with negative real part. So,
since λ > 0, the eigenvalues of λI − Q∗ε (x¯, w¯i) are all
positive. On the other hand, by assumption the eigenvalues
of DxF (x¯) are all negative or complex with negative real
part. Therefore, none of the eigenvalues of J (x¯, x¯i) is zero,
and by the Stable Manifold Theorem (cf. e.g. [19, Section
2.7]), the stable manifold near (x¯, w¯i) has the dimension d.
This means that there is a d-dimensional stable manifold such
that any trajectory on the manifold remains on the manifold
and converges to (x¯, w¯i). By the uniqueness of solution, there
is exactly one trajectory whose x-components reaches x0. Let
{(x (s) , zi,ε (s)) : s ≥ 0} denote this trajectory. Then there is
T > 0 such that (x (s) , zi,ε (s)) ∈ Dεil for s > T . In particular,
we can ﬁnd a neighborhood in the form Nδ (x¯) × Nδ (w¯i)
where
Nδ (x¯) = {x ∈ Ω : |x− x¯|Rd < δ} ,
Nδ (w¯i) = {wi ∈ Rm : |wi − w¯i|Rm < δ}
such that N¯δ (x¯) × N¯δ (w¯i) ⊂ Dεi,l and choose T so that
x (T ) ∈ ∂Nδ (x¯). Since φ∗i,ε = φ∗i in Dεil, if ε is sufﬁciently
small, zi,ε (s) is independent of ε for s ≥ T . We denote the
trajectory by (x (s) , zi (s)) for s > T .
We next extend the solution of (15) for s < T . Consider
the terminal value problem
dzji,ε/ds = λzji,ε − g∗ji,ε (x, zi)
−∑mμ=1 q∗jμ,ε (x (s) , zi,ε) zμi,ε, s ∈ [0, T );
zji,ε (T ) = zji (T ) , j = 1, . . . ,m, i = 1, . . . , n.
(16)
Since the right-hand side of (16) is continuously
differentiable in (x, z), the solution exists and is unique
on the interval [0, T ]. We denote the solution by zji,ε (s).
We show that the functions zji,ε is uniformly bounded and
equicontinuous on [0, T ]. Using a change of variable τ = T−s
and Zi,ε (τ) = (zji,ε (T − τ))mj=1, Problem (16) is equivalent
to the integral equation
Zi,ε (τ) = zi (T ) +
∫ τ
0
Hi,ε (ξ, Zi,ε (ξ)) dξ for τ ∈ [0, T ]
where
Hi,ε (ξ, Zi,ε) = −λZi,ε + g∗i,ε (x (ξ) , Zi,ε)
+Q∗ε (x (ξ) , Zi,ε)Zi,ε.
Since the functions gi (x, φ) and Q (x, φ) are bounded, there
is a constant M > 0 such that |Hi,ε (ξ, Zi,ε)| ≤ M |Zi,ε| for
ξ ∈ [0, T ]. Let S ⊂ C [0, T ] be the set of continuous function
such that f ∈ S if
|f (τ)| ≤ MweMτ for τ ∈ [0, T ] ,
where Mw = maxi=1,...,n {|w¯i|+ δ}, and deﬁne mapping K :
S → C [0, T ] by
(Kf) (τ) = zi (T ) +
∫ τ
0
Hi,ε (ξ, f (ξ)) dξ.
Then for any f ∈ S we have
|(Kf) (τ)| ≤ |zi (T )|+M
∫ τ
0
|f (ξ)| dξ
≤ Mw +MMw
∫ τ
0
eMξdξ = Mwe
Mτ
for any τ ∈ [0, T ]. This proves that KS ⊂ S. Thus {zi,ε} is
uniformly bounded on [0, T ].
We next show that zi,ε (s) is equicontinuous. Let τ1, τ2 ∈
[0, T ]. Then
|(Kf) (τ1)− (Kf) (τ2)| =
∣∣∣∫ τ2τ1 Hi,ε (ξ, f (ξ)) dξ
∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∫ τ2τ1 M |f (ξ)| dξ
∣∣∣ ≤ M |wi (T )| eMT |τ1 − τ2| .
This proves that KS is equi-continuous.
Thus, by the Ascoli-Arzera Theorem, there is a sequence
εk → 0 such that zi,εk converges to a continuous function
zi on [0, T ]. By the construction of φ∗ε , it follows that
φ∗εk (x, zi,εk) → φ∗ (x, zi) pointwise in each Dil. Thus
φ∗εk (x, zi,εk) → φ∗ (x, zi) a.e. in Ω × S. Let wi,εk and
wi be the function such that wi,εk (x (s)) = zi,εk (s) and
wi (x (s)) = zi (s), where x (s) is the solution of the ﬁrst
equation of (15). Since the ﬁrst equation of (15) has a unique
solution for any initial value x0 ∈ Ω, wi,εk (x) is deﬁned on
Ω and satisfy the partial differential equation
λwi,εk = g
∗
i,εk
(x,wi,εk)+F (x) ∂xwi,εk+Q
∗
εk
(x,wi,εk)wi,εk
(17)
classically in Ω. So for any v ∈ L2 (Ω;Rm) by the dominated
convergence theorem we haves∫
Ω
〈
v, g∗i,εk (x,wi,εk) + F (x) ∂xwi,εk
−λwi,εk +Q∗εk (x,wi,εk)wi,εk
〉
dx = 0.
(18)
Since wi,εk → wi in C (Ω) and g∗i,εk (x,wi,εk (x))
and Q∗εk (x,wi,εk (x)) converge to gi (x, φ
∗ (x,wi (x))) and
Q (x, φ∗ (x,wi (x))) a.e. in Ω, respectively, it follows that
lim
k→∞
[∫
Ω
〈
v, g∗i,εk (x,wi,εk)− λwi,εk
〉
dx
+
∫
Ω
〈
v,Q∗εk (x,wi,εk)wi,εk
〉
dx
]
=
∫
Ω
〈v, g∗i (x,wi)− λwi +Q∗ (x,wi)wi〉 dx
for any v ∈ L2 (Ω;Rm). It remains to show that
lim
k′→∞
∫
Ω
〈
v, F (x) ∂xwi,εk′
〉
dx =
∫
Ω
〈v, F (x) ∂xwi〉 dx
(19)
for a subsequence
(
wi,εk′
)
of (wi,εk). For this purpose
we show that (wi,εk) is bounded in H
1 (Ω\Nδ (x¯)). The
boundedness of wi,εk in L
2 (Ω\Nδ (x¯)) follows directly from
the boundedness of S. To see that ∂xwi,εk is bounded, we use
(17), which leads to
F (x) ∂xwi,εk = λwi,εk−g∗i,εk (x,wi,εk)−Q∗εk (x,wi,εk)wi,εk
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to conclude that F (x) ∂xwi,εk is bounded on Ω\Nδ (x¯) since
wi,εk , g
∗
i,εk
and Q∗εk are bounded. Observe that since F (x) 
=
0 if x 
= x¯ in Ω, there is a constant ρ > 0 such that
|F (x)| > ρ in Ω\Nδ (x¯). Hence, the above equation implies
that |∂xwi,εk |L∞ is bounded in Ω\Nδ (x¯). Since Ω is bounded,
it follows that ∂xwi,ε is bounded in L2 (Ω\Nδ (x¯)).
By the weak compactness of bounded sets in
H1 (Ω\Nδ (x¯)), there is a subsequence
(
wi,εk′
)
that is
weakly convergent. Thus, since in Nδ (x¯) all wi,εk = wi for
all k, we have
lim
k′→∞
∫
Ω
〈
v, F (x) ∂xwi,εk′
〉
dx
=
∫
Nδ(x¯)
〈v, F (x) ∂xwi〉 dx
+ lim
k′→∞
∫
Ω\Nδ(x¯)
〈
v, F (x) ∂xwi,εk′
〉
dx
=
∫
Nδ(x¯)
〈v, F (x) ∂xwi〉 dx
+
∫
Ω\Nδ(x¯)
〈v, F (x) ∂xwi〉 dx
=
∫
Ω
〈v, F (x) ∂xwi〉 dx.
This proves (19).
As we have shown that
lim
k′→∞
∫
Ω
〈
v, g∗i,εk′
(
x,wi,εk′
)
+ F (x) ∂xwi,εk′
−λwi,k′ +Q∗εk′
(
x,wi,εk′
)
wi,εk′
〉
dx
=
∫
Ω
〈v, g∗i (x,wi) + F (x) ∂xwi − λwi〉 dx
+
∫
Ω
〈v,Q∗ (x,wi)wi〉 dx
as k → ∞, by (18), {w, φ} is a weak solution of (1)–(3). This
completes the proof of the theorem.
B. Computation of Solution
Based on the idea of the proof of Theorem 1, we propose
the following method of computing approximate solution of
(1)-(3).
1) For any i = 1, . . . , n, we ﬁrst ﬁnd an approximate
solution near the equilibrium point (x¯, w¯i). Since (x¯, w¯i)
is in the interior of a subdomain Dil in which φ∗ of (3)
is constant, one can construct an approximate solution
using the Taylor expansion. To do so, differentiate (1)
to obtain equations for the derivatives of wji at x¯,
λ (wji)xμ (x¯)
=
d∑
k=1
(Fk)xμ (x¯) (wji)xk (x¯)
+
d∑
k=1
(gji)xμ (x¯, φ
∗ (x¯))
+
m∑
l=1
(qjl)xμ (x¯, φ
∗ (x¯)) w¯li
+
m∑
l=1
qjl (x¯, φ
∗ (x¯)) (wli)xμ (x¯) ,
λ (wji)xμxν (x¯)
=
d∑
k=1
(Fk)xμxν (x¯) (wji)xk (x¯)
+
d∑
k=1
2 (Fk)xμ (x¯) (wji)xkxν (x¯)
+
d∑
k=1
(gji)xμxν (x¯, φ
∗ (x¯))
+
m∑
l=1
(gjl)xμxν (x¯, φ
∗ (x¯)) w¯li
+2
m∑
l=1
(gjl)xμ (x¯, φ
∗ (x¯)) (wli)xν (x¯)
+
m∑
l=1
gjl (x¯, φ
∗ (x¯)) (wli)xμxν (x¯) , . . .
The derivatives can be solved from each equation
because the eigenvalues of DxF (x¯) and (qjl (x¯, φ∗))
are negative or complex with a negative real part. Thus,
we can use a Taylor polynomial
wji (x) ≈ wji (x¯) +∇xwji (x¯) · (x− x¯)
+
1
2
(x− x¯)T D2xwji (x¯) (x− x¯) + · · ·
to approximate wji (x) for x near x¯. The function
φ (x,w) can then be approximated by solving (3).
2) We then use an iterative scheme to construct an
approximate solution. The ﬁrst step is to assumes a
function φ(0) (x) and substitute it for φ∗ in (1) to obtain
a numerical solution w(1)i (x). We then solve (3) to
obtain φ(1) from w(1)i . In general, if φ
(k) has been
obtained, we use it to substitute for φ∗ in (1) and solve
the equations for w(k+1)i , and then solve (3) to obtain
φ(k+1). In general, since there are ﬁnite many possible
values of φ, the two sequences
{
w
(k)
i
}
and
{
φ(k)
}
are
likely to converge to a cyclic limits. Pressumably, the
smaller the stepsize in the numerical approximation of
the solution w(k)i to the differential equations (1), the
smaller the diviation of the solutions
{
w
(k)
i , φ
(k)
}
in
the cyclic limits, and thus the better approximation.
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3) After solving the function φ∗ (x), the last step is to solve
the dynamical system (6), (8) with u = φ∗ (x) and with
any given initial conditions x (0) and p (0). This is an
initial-value problem of a system of ordinary differential
equations, whose solution is easy to obtain.
This general approach is illustrated in Section III by a
two-player democratization model.
III. A MODEL OF DEMOCRATIZATION
In this section we apply the method developed in
Section II to a differential game model of democratization
as an illustration. Mathematical modeling of changing
societies using game theories has been an active research
area for decades. Various game theories have been used
in the study of politico-economic phenomena. Major
societal transformations such as institutional changes in
non-democracy and democratization processes have been
extensively investigated (cf. [1]-[5], [10]-[12], [14]-[18] and
references therein). In particular, there is a large body of
literature on the co-evolution of the economic and political
development of the society ([2], [7], [10], [12], [13], [18],
[23]). On the other hand, many models are formulated as
discrete time dynamic games rather than continuous time
differential games. Since in many cases there are continuously
varying state variables involved in the transition of a society,
it is often more convenient to formulate differential game
models. We formulate a two-player democratization model
below as an example.
A. Model Description
In [12] a model of democratization in a society is
proposed that consists of four social groups, the monarch,
landowners, capitalists, and labors. The underlying concept
of the modelling is that democratization is considered as a
transition process of the political power from being highly
concentrated in the hands of a small number of people
to being widely shared by the general population. As the
history exhibits, this process takes multiple stages. Different
social groups enter into the political arena at different times.
Typically a social group’s quest for political power begins
with the group becoming economically powerful, capable
of challenging the ruler. Eventually confrontations break out
resulting in either the challenging group being adopted into the
ruling class peacefully, or the challenging group overtakes the
ruling group in a revolt and becomes the new ruler. The model
in [12] divides this process into two steps, (1) from monarchy
to oligarchy, during which period capitalists, with or without
help of landowners, gain political power from the monarch;
and (2) from oligarchy to democracy, during which period
labors and the general population gain political power. As each
stage involves confrontations between only two parties, the
model is a game of two players, the ruler and a challenging
group. The original model is formulated as an inﬁnite-horizon
discrete-time repeated game. To incorporate the continuous
growth of the state variable, which is the total physical capital
in the state, we reformulate the model as a continuous-time
differential game. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the ﬁrst stage, from
monarchy to oligarchy, with the monarch and capitalists as
players, and use i = m, c to denote the monarch and the
capitalists, respectively.
The elements of the model include the payoff rates of the
players, the strategies of the players, the continuously-varying
state variables, the modes of the society and their transition
rates.
The payoff rates of the players are their after-tax incomes.
Each social group in the society has certain gross (before-tax)
income Ii which depends on the total amount of physical
capital, K, and the total amount of human capital, H , available
in the society at the time. Following [12] we assume that H
is a constant during the transition period from monarchy to
oligarchy. Hence only K = K (t) varies with time. Let Im,
Ic, Il, and Iw represent the before-tax income of the monarch,
the capitalists, the landowners, and the labors, respectively.
As shown by Proposition 1 in Appendix, the gross incomes
depend on K in the form
Im = Cm (L+K)
−α
, Il = Cl (L+K)
−α
,
Ic = CcK (L+K)
−α
, Iw = Cw (L+K)
1−α
,
(20)
where Cm, Cl, Cc, Cw and L are positive constants. The
after-tax income of a social group is its before-tax income
plus or minus an amount of tax revenue. Tax is collected at a
ﬁxed rate rT ∈ (0, 1) from all individuals who are not in the
ruling body. So an individual having the before-tax income I
pays tax rT I . There is a tax collecting cost so that the ruler
receives rˆT I from the individual for some constant rˆT < rT .
The tax revenue is shared among members of the ruling group
in proportion to their economic power. The after-tax income
also depends on the mode of the society. The society can be
either in a peaceful mode or in the aftermath of a revolt. The
former is a time when there has not been a revolt recently.
In this mode a non-ruler only pays the tax, so his after-tax
income is Π = (1− rT ) I . The latter is a time when the
society just endured a revolt and needs to be recovered. During
this period individuals on the defeated side pays reparation in
proportion to his before-tax income. Thus we assume that there
is a constant θ ∈ (0, 1) such that Π = θ (1− rT ) I . In the case
where both players are rulers, the recovery cost is paid by an
extra tax collected from non-rulers.
Hence there are six modes of the society, depending on who
is the ruler and whether the society is in peaceful mode or in
the aftermath of a revolt. Let σj , j = 1, . . . , 6 denote the states
σ1 = (m, p) , σ2 = (m, a) , σ3 = (c, p) ,
σ4 = (c, a) , σ5 = (b, p) , σ6 = (b, a)
where the ﬁrst component m, c, or b indicates the ruler being
the monarch, the capitalists, or both players, and the second
component p or a indicates whether the society is in a peaceful
mode or in the aftermath of a revolt. Let gji be the after-tax
income for i = m, c in states σj , j = 1, . . . , 6. Then the above
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rules lead to the after-tax income of both players,
g1m = g2m = Im + rˆT (Ic + Il + Iw) ,
g3m = (1− rT ) Im, g4m = θ (1− rT ) Im,
g5m = Im +
Im
Im+Ic
rˆT (Il + Iw) ,
g6m = Im +
Im
Im+Ic
θrˆT (Il + Iw) ,
g1c = (1− rT ) Ic, g2c = θ (1− rT ) Ic,
g3c = g4c = Ic + rˆT (Im + Il + Iw)
g5c = Ic +
Ic
Im+Ic
rˆT (Il + Iw) ,
g6c = Ic +
Ic
Im+Ic
θrˆT (Il + Iw) .
(21)
Each player’s objective is to maximize its total discounted
payoff
Ui (t) = E
t
i
∫ ∞
t
e−λ(τ−t)Πi (τ) dτ
=
∫ ∞
t
e−λ(τ−t) 〈p (τ) , gi (K (τ))〉 dτ
using its available actions, where p (τ) = (p1 (τ) , . . . , p6 (τ))
is the probability distribution of the modes of the state
σ1, . . . , σ6.
The available actions for the non-ruling player at any time
are to challenge and not to challenge the ruler, and the
available actions for the ruler are to repress and to compromise
with the challenger. The actions cause the society to change
from one mode to another. If the non-ruling player does not
challenge the ruler and if the society is in a peaceful mode, the
mode will not be changed. If the society is in the aftermath
of a revolt, it transfers to a peaceful mode at a ﬁxed transition
rate. We choose a time scale so that this transition rate is
1. If the non-ruling group challenges the ruler and the ruler
compromises with the challenger, the challenger’s status will
be transferred to a ruler at the transition rate 1. In this case
if previously the society is in the aftermath of a revolt, it will
be transferred to a peaceful mode. If the ruler represses the
challenger, then either the ruler remains in power or the power
changes hands, according to the relative coercive capacities of
the players, and the society transfers to the mode of aftermath
of a revolt at rate 1 if it was previously in a peaceful mode.
The coercive capacity of a player is the strength of the player
in a confrontation against the other player. It depends on
the player’s resources and skill of using the resources. Let
πm (t) and πc (t) be the coercive capacities of the monarch
and capitalists, respectively. Following [12], we assume that
πi (τ) = eiIi (τ) , i = m, c (22)
where ei is the player’s organizing effectiveness. We choose
a scale so that em = 1. In addition, the ruler enjoys an
“incumbency advantegy” represented by a factor χ > 1. So if
a confrontation occurs, the transition rate for the challenging
group to overtake the ruler is
q =
πc
πc + πr
where πc and πr are the coercive capacities of the challenging
group and the ruler, respectively.
We write the transition matrix (qjμ) as follows. Let(
φμm, φμc
) ∈ {(0, 0) , (0, 1) , (1, 0) , (1, 1)} represent the
actions of the monarch and capitalists, where 0 means no
challenge for the non-ruler and compromise for the ruler, and 1
means revolt for the non-ruler and repress for the ruler. Not all
elements of the set are available strategies in any mode of the
state. For example in σ5 and σ6, no action is available for any
player. If the current state is σ1 or σ2, then the available pure
strategies are (0, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1). The mixed strategies are(
1− φjc
)
(0, 0) +
(
1− φjm
)
φjc (0, 1) + φjmφjc (1, 1)
with φjm, φjc ∈ [0, 1] for j = 1, 2. Based on the rule of game
described above, we have
q11 = −φ1c, q12 = φ1mφ1c
χπm
χπm + πc
,
q14 = φ1mφ1c
πc
χπm + πc
, q15 = (1− φ1m)φ1c,
q21 = 1− φ2c, q22 = −1 + φ2mφ2c
χπm
χπm + πc
,
q24 = φ2mφ2c
πc
χπm + πc
, q26 = (1− φ2m)φ2c.
Similarly, if the current state is σ3 or σ4, then the total
mixed strategies are(
1− φjm
)
(0, 0) +
(
1− φjc
)
φjm (1, 0) + φjmφjc (1, 1)
with φjm, φjc ∈ [0, 1] for j = 3, 4. One can show that the
transition rates are
q32 = φ3mφ3c
πm
πm + χπc
, q33 = −φ3m,
q34 = φ3mφ3c
χπc
πm + χπc
, q35 = (1− φ3c)φ3m,
q42 = φ4mφ4c
πm
πm + χπc
, q43 = 1− φ4m,
q44 = −1 + φ4mφ4c
χπc
πm + χπc
, q46 = (1− φ4c)φ4m.
By (22), we denote
χπm
χπm + πc
=
χIm
χIm + ecIc
≡ η (K) ,
πc
χπm + πc
=
ecIc
χIm + ecIc
= 1− η (K) ,
πm
πm + χπc
=
Im
Im + χecIc
≡ 1− δ (K) ,
χπc
πm + χπc
=
χecIc
Im + χecIc
≡ δ (K) .
Then the transition matrix, Q (φm, φc) ≡ (qkl)6×6, with the
mixed strategy, (φm, φc) ∈ [0, 1]8, has the entries
q12 = φ1mφ1cη, q14 = φ1mφ1c (1− η) ,
q15 = (1− φ1m)φ1c, q21 = 1− φ2c,
q24 = φ2mφ2c (1− η) , q16 = (1− φ2m)φ2c,
q32 = φ3mφ3c (1− δ) , q34 = φ3mφ3cδ,
q35 = φ3m (1− φ3c) , q42 = φ4mφ4c (1− δ) ,
q43 = 1− φ4m, q46 = φ4m (1− φ4c) ,
q65 = 1, qkk = −
∑
l =k qkl, k = 1, . . . , 6,
(23)
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and all other entries are zero. It follows that the probability
distribution p (t) is governed by (8), which has the component
form
dp1/dt = −φ1cp1 + (1− φ2c) p2,
dp2/dt = φ1mφ1cηp1 + (−1 + φ2mφ2cη) p2
+φ3mφ3c (1− δ) p3 + φ4mφ4c (1− δ) p4,
dp3/dt = −φ3mp3 + (1− φ4m) p4,
dp4/dt = φ1mφ1c (1− η) p1 + φ2mφ2c (1− η) p2
+φ3mφ3cδp3 + (−1 + φ4mφ4cδ) p4,
dp5/dt = (1− φ1m)φ1cp1 + φ3m (1− φ3c) p3 + p6,
dp6/dt = (1− φ2m)φ2cp2 + φ4m (1− φ4c) p4 − p6.
(24)
There is only one dynamical state variable during the ﬁrst
stage of democratization, which is the total physical capital
K (t). The capital grows with the investment made by all
individuals in the society. It is shown in [12] assuming a
log-linear utility function that an individual having an income
I would make an investment by the amount
b (K) = β [I (K)− Z]+ (25)
for the future, where β and Z are positive constants. (See
Appendix for details.) Let Nm, Nc, Nl, and Nw be the
populations of the capitalists, landowners and the labors.
We may assume that an individual has the average income
I = Im/Nm, Ic/Nc, Il/Nl or Iw/Nw depending on whether
the individual is the monarch, a capitalist, a landowner, or a
labor, respectively. Hence the investments made by the social
groups are
bm = β
[
Im
Nm
− Z
]
+
= β [Im −NmZ]+ ,
and similarly
bl = β [Il −NlZ]+ , bc = β [Ic −NcZ]+ ,
bw = β [Iw −NwZ]+ ,
where [a]+ = max {a, 0} for any a ∈ R. If we further assume
that Nm is negligible, then bm = βIm. As there is no other
form of investment, we propose that all the investments goes
to the physical capital. Thus K (t) is governed by the initial
value problem
dK/dτ = −aK +B (K) , K (t) = x, (26)
where
B = β
{
Im + [Il −NlZ]+ + [Ic −NcZ]+ + [Iw −NwZ]+
}
(27)
is the total investment and a > 0 is the capital depreciation
rate. This concludes the description of the elements of the
model.
B. Existence of Solution
Note that the function on the right-hand side of (26) is
independent of the mode σ, and quantities gji and qμν are
independent of time t. Thus (12) is valid and can be used to
ﬁnd the strategies. We use Theorem 1 to prove the existence
of solution φ∗ (t), K (τ) and p (τ) given the initial conditions
K (t) = x and p (t) = y if the equilibrium x¯ of the equation
dx/ds = −ax+B (x) (28)
is either sufﬁciently large or sufﬁciently small. We ﬁrst observe
that by (20) and (27), B (x) is continuous in x ∈ R+, B (0) ≥
βIm (0) = βCmL
−α > 0, and B (x) ≤ M (L+ x)1−α in R
for some constant M . Thus B (x) < ax if x is sufﬁciently
large. Hence by the Intermediate Value Theorem, (28) has at
least one positive equilibrium. In addition, an equilibrium is
asymptotically stable if the derivative f ′ (x) = −a+B′ (x) is
negative at the equilibrium.
We next show that the maximization problem (13) has a
solution for any x ∈ (x, x¯] and wi ∈ Rm, i = m, c. Note
that since gm and gc are independent of φ, (12) has the vector
form
λwm (x) = gm (x) + (−ax+B (x))w′m (x)
+Q (φ∗m, φ
∗
c)wm (x) ,
λwc (x) = gc (x) + (−ax+B (x))w′c (x)
+Q (φ∗m, φ
∗
c)wc (x) .
(29)
Thus (13) takes the form
maximize
φi∈Xi(φ∗−i)
Qj
(
x, φi, φ
∗
−i
)
wi, i = m, c.
Recall that by the rule of game, at any moment t the
non-ruler ﬁrst chooses its strategy as to whether or not to
revolt, anticipating that the ruler will choose whether to
represses the revolt or to compromises with the challenger
according to its best interest.
For j = 1, 2 the monarch is the ruler. So the capitalists ﬁrst
choose their (mixed) strategy φ∗jc and the monarch responds
with a (possibly mixed) strategy φ∗jm so that
φ∗jm = argmax
φjm∈[0,1]
Qj
(
φjm, φ
∗
jc
)
wm (x) .
Note that Qj is bilinear in φjm and φjc. Thus
Qj
(
φjm, φ
∗
jc
)
wm = φjmQj
(
1, φ∗jc
)
wm
+
(
1− φjm
)
Qj
(
0, φ∗jc
)
wm.
In case φ∗jc = 0, there is no choice for the monarch except
φ∗jm = 0. If φ
∗
jc = 1 then either φ
∗
jm = 0 if
Qj (0, 1)wm ≥ Qj (1, 1)wm (30)
or φ∗jm = 1 if the reversed inequality holds. With this
knowledge the capitalists would choose φ∗jc = 0 if (30) holds
and
Qj (0, 0)wc ≥ Qj (0, 1)wc; (31)
or if the reversed inequality of (30) holds and
Qj (0, 0)wc ≥ Qj (1, 1)wc.
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 mjmj wQwQ 1,11,0 t
Yes
No
    cjcj wQwQ 1,10,0 t
Yes
No
    cjcj wQwQ 1,00,0 t
Yes
No
)0,0(
)1,0(
)1,1(
Fig. 1 Decision making when the monarch is in power (j = 1, 2)
    cjcj wQwQ 1,10,1 t
Yes
No
    mjmj wQwQ 1,10,0 t
Yes
No
    mjmj wQwQ 0,10,0 t
Yes
No
)0,0(
)0,1(
)1,1(
Fig. 2 Decision making when the capitalists are in power (j = 3, 4)
Hence,
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (0, 1) if
Qj (0, 1)wm ≥ Qj (1, 1)wm, Qj (0, 0)wc < Qj (0, 1)wc;(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (1, 1) if
Qj (0, 1)wm < Qj (1, 1)wm, Qj (0, 0)wc < Qj (1, 1)wc;
and
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (0, 0) in the remaining cases (See Fig.
1).
Speciﬁcally,
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (0, 1) if
w5m ≥ ηw2m + (1− η)w4m, w1c < w5c; (32)
(φ∗1m, φ
∗
1c) = (1, 1) if
w5m < ηw2m + (1− η)w4m, w1c < ηw2c + (1− η)w4c;
and (φ∗1m, φ
∗
1c) = (0, 0) in the remaining cases. Similarly,
(φ∗2m, φ
∗
2c) = (0, 1) if
w6m ≥ ηw2m + (1− η)w4m, w1c < w6c; (33)
(φ∗2m, φ
∗
2c) = (1, 1) if
w6m < ηw2m + (1− η)w4m, w1c < ηw2c + (1− η)w4c;
and (φ∗2m, φ
∗
2c) = (0, 0) in the remaining cases.
For j = 3, 4 the capitalists are the ruler. A similar reasoning
shows that
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (1, 0) if
Qj (1, 0)wc ≥ Qj (1, 1)wc, Qj (0, 0)wm < Qj (1, 0)wm;(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (1, 1) if
Qj (1, 0)wc < Qj (1, 1)wc, Qj (0, 0)wm < Qj (1, 1)wm;
and
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (0, 0) in the remaining cases (See Fig. 2).
In terms of components of wm and wc, (φ∗3m, φ
∗
3c) = (1, 0)
if
w5c ≥ (1− δ)w2c + δw4c, w3m < w5m;
(φ∗3m, φ
∗
3c) = (1, 1) if
w5c < (1− δ)w2c + δw4c, w3m < (1− δ)w2m + δw4m;
and (φ∗3m, φ
∗
3c) = (0, 0) in the remaining cases. Similarly,
(φ∗4m, φ
∗
4c) = (1, 0) if
w6c ≥ (1− δ)w2c + δw4c, w3m < w6m;
(φ∗4m, φ
∗
4c) = (1, 1) if
w6c < (1− δ)w2c + δw4c, w3m < (1− δ)w2m + δw4m;
and (φ∗4m, φ
∗
4c) = (0, 0) in the remaining cases.
Hence, the rule of game completely determines pure
strategies φ∗m (x,wi) and φ
∗
c (x,wi) for any x and wi.
Let x¯ be an equilibrium of (28). We next show that the
equations for the steady states, (14), has a solution if x¯ is
sufﬁciently large or sufﬁciently small. Note that equations in
(14) have the form
λwm (x¯) = gm (x¯) +Q (φ
∗
m, φ
∗
c)wm (x¯) ,
λwc (x¯) = gc (x¯) +Q (φ
∗
m, φ
∗
c)wc (x¯) .
(34)
Lemma 2: If x¯ is sufﬁciently large then there is a steady
state solution (w¯m, w¯c) that satisﬁes
w¯1i =
λg¯1i + g¯5i
λ (λ+ 1)
, w¯2i =
g¯2i
λ+ 1
+
g¯5i + λg¯6i
λ (λ+ 1)
2 , w¯3i =
g¯3i
λ
,
w¯4i =
g¯3i + λg¯4i
λ (λ+ 1)
, w¯5i =
g¯5i
λ
, w¯6i =
g¯5i + λg¯6i
λ (λ+ 1)
for i = m, c corresponding to
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (0, 1) for j = 1, 2
and
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (0, 0) for j = 3, 4, where g¯ji = gji (x¯).
Similarly, if x¯ is sufﬁciently small then there is a steady
state solution with
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (0, 0) for j = 1, 2 and(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (1, 0) for j = 3, 4.
Proof: For
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (0, 1) for j = 1, 2 and(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (0, 0) for j = 3, 4 we compute
Q =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−1 0 0 0 1 0
0 −1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 −1
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (35)
Thus
Qwi = (−w1i + w5i,−w2i + w6i, 0, w3i − w4i, 0, w5i − w6i)
for i = m, c. Equations in (34) have the form
λw1i = g1i − w1i + w5i, λw2i = g2i − w2i + w6i,
λw3i = g3i, λw4i = g4i + w3i − w4i,
λw5i = g5i, λw6i = g6i + w5i − w6i.
We verify that (32), (33) hold if x¯ is sufﬁciently large. This
will imply that
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
= (0, 1) for j = 1, 2. The ﬁrst
inequality in (32) has the form
g5m
λ
≥ η
(
g2m
λ+ 1
+
g5m + λg6m
λ (λ+ 1)
2
)
+ (1− η) g3m + λg4m
λ (λ+ 1)
.
(36)
If x¯  1 then η  1. By (21)
g4m < g3m < g6m < g5m. (37)
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Thus the right-hand side of (36) is close to
g3m + λg4m
λ (λ+ 1)
<
g5m
λ
.
The second inequality in (32) has the form
λg1c + g5c
λ (λ+ 1)
<
g5c
λ
which is equivalent to g1c < g5c. This is true by (21). The
ﬁrst inequality in (33) has the form
g5m + λg6m
λ (λ+ 1)
≥ η
(
g2m
λ+ 1
+
g5m + λg6m
λ (λ+ 1)
2
)
+(1− η) g3m + λg4m
λ (λ+ 1)
.
For η  1 the right-hand side is close to
(g3m + λg4m) /λ (λ+ 1). It is less than the left-hand
side due to (37). The second inequality in (33) has the form
λg1c + g5c
λ (λ+ 1)
<
g5c + λg6c
λ (λ+ 1)
.
In view of (21) which implies g1c < g6c, the above
inequality holds. We next show that
w5c < (1− δ)w2c + δw4c, w3m < w5m, (38)
w3m ≥ (1− δ)w2m + δw4m (39)
if x¯  1. By the deﬁnition of δ, x¯  1 implies δ is close to
1. Thus by (21) the right-hand side of the ﬁrst inequality is
close to
w4c =
g3c + λg4c
λ (λ+ 1)
=
g3c
λ
>
g5c
λ
= w5c.
By (37)
w3m =
g3m
λ
<
g5m
λ
= w5m,
the second inequality of (38) holds. For δ close to 1 the
right-hand side of the third inequality in (38) is close to
w4m =
g3m + λg4m
λ (λ+ 1)
.
By (37)
g3m + λg4m
λ (λ+ 1)
<
g3m
λ
= w3m.
This completes the proof of (38). Hence (φ∗3m, φ
∗
3c) =
(0, 0). Finally, we can show that
w6c < (1− δ)w2c + δw4c, w3m < w6m, (40)
if x¯  1. By the deﬁnition of δ, δ is close to 1. Thus by (21)
the right-hand side of the ﬁrst inequality is close to
w4c =
g3c + λg4c
λ (λ+ 1)
>
g5c + λg6c
λ (λ+ 1)
= w6c.
By (37)
w3m =
g3m
λ
<
g5m + λg6m
λ (λ+ 1)
= w6m,
the second inequality of (40) holds. This completes the proof
of (40). This implies that (φ∗4m, φ
∗
4c) = (0, 0).
With these preparation we have
Theorem 3: Let x¯ be an equilibrium of (28) which is
asymptotically stable and B′ (x¯) < a. Suppose x¯ is sufﬁciently
large such that the conclusion of Lemma 2 holds, and
φ∗ (x,wi) = φ∗ (x¯, w¯i) in a neighborhood of (x¯, w¯i). Let
x be either 0 or the largest equilibrium of (28) less than x¯.
Then Problem (29) has a solution (wm (x) , wc (x)) at any
x ∈ (x, x¯].
Proof.: Hypothesis (H)–(1) and (2) are obviously
satisﬁed. Note that the φ∗ (x,wi) is uniquely determined by
the rules described in Figs. 1 and 2, and is piecewise constant.
The boundaries of the subdomains in which φ∗ is constant are
given by one of the equations
Qj (0, 1)wm (x) = Qj (1, 1)wm (x) ,
Qj (0, 0)wc (x) = Qj (0, 1)wc (x) ,
Qj (0, 0)wc (x) = Qj (1, 1)wc (x) for j = 1, 2,
and
Qj (1, 0)wc (x) = Qj (1, 1)wc (x) ,
Qj (0, 0)wm (x) = Qj (1, 1)wm (x) ,
Qj (0, 0)wm (x) = Qj (1, 0)wm (x) for j = 3, 4.
In component form, the equations are
w5m − ηw2m − (1− η)w4m = 0, w1c − w5c = 0,
w1c − ηw2c − (1− η)w4c = 0,
w6m − ηw2m − (1− η)w4m = 0, w1c − w6c = 0,
w5c − (1− δ)w2c − δw4c = 0,
w3m − (1− δ)w2m − δw4m = 0, w3m − w5m = 0,
w6c − (1− δ)w6c − δw4c = 0, w3m − w5m = 0.
The functions γl,μ that deﬁne the boundaries ∂Dl are the
left-hand sides of the above equations. The conclusion then
follows from Theorem 1.
We present an example to show how the solution can be
computed.
C. A Numerical Example
Let us choose the parameters
α = β = 1/2, AHα = 3/2, Lm = 0.4, Ll = 0.6,
Nc = 0.1, Nl = 0.4, Nw = 0.5, Z = 15/
√
8
and
a =
39
1100
√
11− 3
160
√
2
Then by (61)
Cm = 3/10, Cl = 9/20, Cc = Cw = 3/4, L = Lm+Ll = 1,
and by (20)
Im (x) =
3
10
√
1 + x
, Il (x) =
9
20
√
1 + x
,
Ic (x) =
3x
4
√
1 + x
, Iw (x) =
3
4
√
1 + x.
(41)
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Hence, by (27),
B (x) =
1
2
{
3
10
√
1 + x
+
[
3x
4
√
1 + x
− 3
4
√
2
]
+
+
[
3
4
√
1 + x
− 3√
2
]
+
+
[
3
4
√
1 + x− 15
8
√
2
]
+
}
.
It can be seen that −ax¯+B (x¯) = 0 at x¯ = 10. Since
3
4
√
1 + x
<
3√
2
,
3
4
√
1 + x ≤ 3
√
11
4
<
15
√
2
8
for x ∈ [0, 10], it follows that
B (x) =
3
20
{
1√
1 + x
+ 5
[
x√
1 + x
− 1√
2
]
+
}
=
{ 3
20
√
1+x
if x ≤ 1,
3
20
[
1+5x√
1+x
− 1√
2
]
if 1 < x ≤ 10.
It can be seen that the only positive solution of the equation
−ax+B (x) = 0
is x = 10.
We next choose the values
rT = 0.2, rˆT = 0.15, θ = 0.5,
λ = 0.6, χ = 1.5, ec = 0.7
and computer gji (x¯) by (21).
Terminal values.: Using (41) with x = x¯ = 10, we ﬁnd
Im (x¯) =
3
10
√
11
, Il (x¯) =
9
20
√
11
,
Ic (x¯) =
15
2
√
11
, Iw (x¯) =
3
4
√
11.
Hence, by (21)
gm (x¯) = (0.823, 0.823, 0.072, 0.036, 0.106, 0.098) ,
gc (x¯) = (1.809, 0.905, 2.668, 2.668, 2.640, 2.451) .
By Lemma 2,
wm (x¯) = (0.624, 0.621, 0.121, 0.098, 0.176, 0.171) ,
wc (x¯) = (3.880, 3.241, 4.447, 4.447, 4.399, 4.281) .
It remains to verify that
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
(x¯, w¯i) = (0, 1) for j =
1, 2 and
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
(x¯, w¯i) = (0, 0) for j = 3, 4. For j = 1, 2,
we verify the relations
Qj (0, 1) w¯m ≥ Qj (1, 1) w¯m, Qj (0, 0) w¯c < Qj (0, 1) w¯c
(42)
(See Fig. 1). By (23),
Q1 (0, 1) = (−1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0) ,
Q1 (1, 1) = (−1, η, 0, (1− η) , 0, 0) ,
Q1 (0, 0) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) ,
where
η =
χIm (x¯)
χIm (x¯) + ecIc (x¯)
≈ 0.07895.
The ﬁrst inequality in (42) has the forms
−w¯1m + w¯5m ≥ −w¯1m + ηw¯2m + (1− η) w¯4m. (43)
The inequality is true using the values of w¯jm. The second
inequality in (42) has the form
0 < −w¯1c + w¯5c. (44)
It is also true in view of the values of w¯jc. Similarly, for
j = 2, by (23)
Q2 (0, 1) = (0,−1, 0, 0, 0, 1) ,
Q2 (1, 1) = (0,−1 + η, 0, 1− η, 0, 0) ,
Q2 (0, 0) = (1,−1, 0, 0, 0, 0) .
The ﬁrst inequality in (42) has the form
−w¯2m + w¯6m ≥ (−1 + η) w¯2m + (1− η) w¯4m. (45)
It is true. The second inequality in (42) has the form
w¯1c − w¯2c < −w¯2c + w¯6c. (46)
It again is true. This proves that
(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
(x¯, w¯i) = (0, 1)
for j = 1, 2.
For j = 3, 4 we verify the relations
Qj (1, 0) w¯c < Qj (1, 1) w¯c, Qj (0, 0) w¯m ≥ Qj (1, 1) w¯m.
(47)
(See Fig. 2.) For j = 3
Q3 (1, 0) = (0, 0,−1, 0, 1, 0) ,
Q3 (1, 1) = (0, 1− δ,−1, δ, 0, 0) ,
Q3 (0, 0) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) .
The ﬁrst inequality has the form
−w¯3c + w¯5c < (1− δ) w¯2c − w¯3c + δw¯4c (48)
where
δ =
χecIc (x¯)
Im (x¯) + χecIc (x¯)
≈ 0.96330.
The inequality is true. The second inequality in (47) has the
form
0 ≥ (1− δ) w¯2m − w¯3m + δw¯4m (49)
which is true. For j = 4, we have
Q4 (1, 0) = (0, 0, 0,−1, 0, 1) ,
Q4 (1, 1) = (0, 1− δ, 0,−1 + δ, 0, 0) ,
Q4 (0, 0) = (0, 0, 1,−1, 0, 0) .
The ﬁrst inequality is
−w¯4c + w¯6c < (1− δ) w¯2c + (−1 + δ)w4c. (50)
It is true. The second inequality is
w¯3m − w¯4m ≥ (1− δ)w2m + (−1 + δ)w4m, (51)
which is also true. This veriﬁes the conditions of Theorem 3.
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We now compute the solution of (29) with the terminal
condition
wjm (10) = w¯jm, wjc (10) = w¯jc,(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
(10) = (0, 1) for j = 1, 2,(
φ∗jm, φ
∗
jc
)
(10) = (0, 0) for j = 3, 4.
The system (29) has the component form
λw1i = g1i + Fw
′
1i − w1i + w5i,
λw2i = g2i + Fw
′
2i − w2i + w6i,
λw3i = g3i + Fw
′
3i,
λw4i = g4i + Fw
′
4i + w3i − w4i,
λw5i = g5i + Fw
′
5i,
λw6i = g6i + Fw
′
6i + w5i − w6i,
for i = m, c, where gji are given by (21) and F (x) = −ax+
B (x).
Initial step–out of singularity.: The equations are singular
at the x¯ = 10. We use a Taylor expansion
wi (x) ≈ wi (x¯) + (x− x¯)w′i (x¯) +
1
2
(x− x¯)2 w′′i (x¯) + . . .
(52)
for i = m, c to ﬁnd an approximate solution near x¯.
Differentiating the equations in (29) with respect to x, and
evaluate the expressions at x¯ we ﬁnd
λw′i (x¯) = g
′
i (x¯) + F
′ (x¯)w′i (x¯) +Qw
′
i (x¯) ,
λw′′i (x¯) = g
′′
i (x¯) + 2F
′ (x¯)w′′i (x¯)
+Qw′′i (x¯) + F
′′ (x¯)w′i (x¯) , . . .
for i = m, c. Using terms up to (x− x¯)2 we obtain
approximate solution given by (52).
Computations show that inequalities
Qj (0, 1)wm (x) ≥ Qj (1, 1)wm (x) ,
Qj (0, 0)wc (x) < Qj (0, 1)wc (x) , j = 1, 2,
Qj (1, 0)wc (x) < Qj (1, 1)wc (x) ,
Qj (0, 0)wm (x) ≥ Qj (1, 1)wm (x) , j = 3, 4
all satisﬁed for x ∈ [9.5, 10]. In component form, these
equations are
w5m, w6m ≥ ηw2m + (1− η)w4m, w1c < w5c, w6c,
w5c, w6c < (1− δ)w2c + δw4c,
w3m ≥ (1− δ)w2m + δw4m.
Thus we use this approximate solution for [9.5, 10].
The differential-algebraic equations.: We continue the
computation of the solution for x ∈ [0, 9.5) using the terminal
data as the value of the approximate solution at x = 9.5,
wm (9.5) = (0.618, 0.614, 0.123, 0.100, 0.180, 0.175) ,
wc (9.5) = (3.781, 3.158, 4.336, 4.336, 4.287, 4.171) .
Note that on this interval the system (29) is not singular.
The computation is carried out using an iteration scheme. In
the initial step Problem (29) is solved with functions φ∗m (x)
and φ∗c (x) subsituted by the functions
φ(0)m (x) = (0, 0, 0, 0) , φ
(0)
c (x) = (1, 1, 0, 0)
for 0 ≤ x ≤ 9.5, respectively. The solution is denoted as(
w
(1)
m (x) , w
(1)
c (x)
)
. Using this solution we ﬁnd functions
φ(1)m (x) and φ
(1)
c (x) that satisfy
φ
(1)
jm (x) = argmax
φjm∈[0,1]
Qj
(
φjm, φ
(1)
jc (x)
)
w
(1)
m (x) ,
φ
(1)
jc (x) = argmax
φjc∈[0,1]
Qj
(
φ
(1)
jm (x) , φjc
)
w
(1)
c (x) ,
(53)
as described by Figs. 1 and 2. In general, if φ(k)m (x)
and φ(k)c (x) have been obtained, we solve Problem
(29) with φ∗m (x) and φ
∗
c (x) substituted by φ
(k)
m (x)
and φ(k)c (x), respectively, and denote the solution as(
w
(k+1)
m (x) , w
(k+1)
c (x)
)
. We then ﬁnd
(
φ(k+1)m , φ
(k+1)
c
)
using (53) with the superscript “(1)” changed to “(k + 1).”
The process can repeated to generate two sequences of
functions
(
φ(k)m (x)
)
,
(
φ(k)c (x)
)
on [0, 9.5]. If the sequences
converge, the limits are the maximizing strategies φ∗m (x) and
φ∗c (x).
The iteration scheme is implemented as follows. The
interval [0, 9.5] is partitioned by n points
0 < x1 < x2 < · · · < xn < 9.5.
A numerical differential equation solver is used to compute
the solution
(
w
(k+1)
m , w
(k+1)
c
)
at points x1, . . . , xn given(
φ(k)m , φ
(k)
c
)
at these points. Then
(
φ(k+1)m , φ
(k+1)
c
)
is
computed at x1, . . . , xn. This process continues. Since given
the points x1,..., xn the there are only ﬁnitely many
possible values of
(
φ(k)m , φ
(k)
c
)
, the process will lead to a
ﬁnite sequence of solutions
{(
φ(k)m , φ
(k)
c
)
,
(
w
(k)
m , w
(k)
c
)}
,
k = k1, k1 + 1, . . . , k2 such that
(
w
(k+1)
m , w
(k+1)
c
)
satisﬁes
Problem (29) with (φ∗m, φ
∗
c) replaced by
(
φ(k)m , φ
(k)
c
)
for
k = k1, . . . , k2 − 1, and
(
w
(k1)
m , w
(k1)
c
)
satisﬁes (29) with
(φ∗m, φ
∗
c) replaced by
(
φ(k2)m , φ
(k2)
c
)
. Among these solutions
we choose k∗ such that∥∥∥(w(k∗)m , w(k∗)c )− (w(k∗+1)m , w(k∗+1)c )∥∥∥
L2[0,9.5]
= min
k=k1,...,,k2
∥∥∥(w(k)m , w(k)c )− (w(k+1)m , w(k+1)c )∥∥∥
L2[0,9.5]
where k2+1 is identiﬁed as k1. It is expected that the smaller
the stepsize maxi |xi+1 − xi|, the smaller the error
εk∗ =
∥∥∥(w(k∗)m , w(k∗)c )− (w(k∗+1)m , w(k∗+1)c )∥∥∥
L2[0,9.5]
.
Computation using equal stepsize xi+1 − xi = 0.01 is
carried out using matlab solver ode15s. The cyclic solutions(
w
(k)
m , w
(k)
c
)
are obtained for k = 129, . . . , 133. The
approximation solution
(
w
(129)
m , w
(129)
c
)
is chosen with the
error ε129 ≈ 0.119. Then the initial value problem (6) and (8)
are solved using the initial conditions
x (0) = 0, p (0) = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) .
These initial data represents the situation that at the
beginning of social transformation, there is no capital in the
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TABLE I
CHANGES OF STRATEGIES OF PLAYERS OVER TIME
time periods φ∗im, φ
∗
2m, φ
∗
3m, φ
∗
4m φ
∗
1c, φ
∗
2c, φ
∗
3c, φ
∗
4c
(0, 0.8) (0, 0, 1, 1) (0, 0, 0, 0)
(0.8, 20.5) (1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 0, 0)
(20.5, 70.3) (0, 0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0, 0)
t > 70.3 (0, 0, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0, 0)
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
(m,p)
(m,a)
(c,p)
(c,a)
(b,p)
(b,a)
Fig. 3 Changes of probabilities of modes with time
society and the monarch is the ruler. Table 1 shows the
approximations of (φ∗m, φ
∗
c):
The probabilities of the modes are graphed in Fig. 3.
As can be seen from Table 1 and Fig. 3, the monarch
initially dominates the political power and the state is in the
mode (m, p) for a short period of time 0 < t < 0.8. During
this period the capitalists do not challenge the monarch since
their strength is weak. As capital increases the capitalists
become stronger. So, in the next period of time, 0.8 < t <
20.5 the capitalists challenge the monarch and the monarch
responds the challenge by repression if the monarch is in
power, or the monarch challenges the capitalists and the latter
repress the revolt if the capitalists are in power. During this
period the state is found in 5 modes of (m, p), (m, a), (c, a),
(b, p) and (b, a), with the probability of (m, p) decreasing, and
the probability of the other the probability of (b, p) increasing.
As the capital continues to increasing, for 20.5 < t < 70.3,
the capitalists greatly over power the monarch. So whenever
the monarch is in power the capitalists will revolt and the
monarch will compromises with the challengers, and whenever
the capitalists are in power, the monarch only revolts when the
state is not in the aftermath of a revolt. During this period
of time the probability of (b, p) continues to rise, and the
probabilities of the other three ﬁrst rise then fall. Eventually,
for t > 70.3, the capitalists always challenge the ruler and
the monarch never represses if the monarch is in power, and
the monarch nevery challenges the capitalists if the latter are
in power. During this period the state (b, p) prevails, and all
other modes fade away.
IV. CONCLUSION
The democratization model studied above can be extended
to include multiple players. In this case, with the possibility
of more than one social groups challenging the ruler
simultaneously, the solution of the maximization problem (13)
may involve Nash equilibria.
For the general case we have established the existence of
solution and developed numerical scheme for the case where
the continuously-varying state variables evolve independently
of discretely-varying state variables and independently
of strategies of the player. This is done because the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is semilinear. The more
general case where there is no such independence is much
more difﬁcult, because the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
is highly nonlinear.
APPENDIX
We show in this appendix that Im, Ic, Il and Iw are
functions of K as in (20). Following [12] we assume that
the land, together with physical capital and human capital,
produce one single good that can be used for consumption
and investment. The monarch and landowners own lands.
Capitalists own the physical capital, and the workers own the
human capital. Each social group earns income from the means
of production that it owns. The land yield of an individual
landowner is
Yl,i = A (Ll,i +Kl,i)
1−α
Hαl,i
where α ∈ (0, 1) is a constant, A is the knowledge stock, Ll,i,
Kl,i and Hl,i are the land, the physical capital, and the human
capital that the landowner i utilizes. The earning of a capitalist
is from renting the physical capital that he possesses, and that
of a worker is from wage he received by offering his human
capital. Let rK and rH be the rental rates of physical capital
and the wage of a unit human capital, respectively. Then the
before-tax incomes of capitalists and workers are
Ic,i = rKKc,i, Iw,i = rHHw,i (54)
where Kc,i is the capital that capitalist i possesses, and Hw,i
is the human capital that worker i possesses. The before-tax
income of the landowners, including the monarch, is their land
yield minus cost of renting physical capital and wages for
hiring workers. Thus the monarch and a landowner have the
before-tax income
Im = A (Lm +Km)
1−α
Hαm − rKKm − rHHm,
Il,i = A (Li +Kl,i)
1−α
Hαi − rKKl,i − rHHl,i,
(55)
respectively, where Lm, Km and Hm are the land, the physical
capital, and the human capital that the monarch utilizes.
The next proposition shows that the rates rK and rH are
determined endogeneously by the market assuming the market
clearing condition.
Proposition 1: Suppose rK and rH are market clearing
prices of the physical capital and human capital, respectively.
Then
rK = (1− α)A
(
H
L+K
)α
,
rH (t) = αA
(
L+K
H
)1−α (56)
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where L = Lm+
∑
i∈landowners Li is the total land in the state.
Furthermore, Im, Il,i deﬁned in (55) have the form
Im = (1− α)A
(
H
L+K
)α
Lm,
Il,i = (1− α)A
(
H
L+K
)α
Ll,i,
Ic,i = (1− α)A
(
H
L+K
)α
Kc,i,
Iw,i = αA
(
L+K
H
)1−α
Hw,i.
(57)
Proof.: By (55), the optimal demands for physical and
human capitals are determined by
rK = (1− α)A (Lm +Km)−αHαm,
rH = αA (Lm +Km)
1−α
Hα−1m .
(58)
Similar identities hold if the subscript “m” is replaced by
“i.” Hence
Lm +Km = Hm
[
(1− α)A
rK
]1/α
= Hm
[
αA
rH
]1/(α−1)
.
(59)
Similar identities hold for Li, Ki and Hi. Using the
identities
Lm +
∑
Li = L, Km +
∑
Ki = K,
Hm +
∑
Hi = H
we ﬁnd
L+K = H
[
(1− α)A
rK
]1/α
= H
[
αA
rH
]1/(α−1)
. (60)
These identities lead to (56).
To prove (57), we substitute (58) into (55) to obtain
Im = A (Lm +Km)
1−α
Hαm
− (1− α)A (Lm +Km)−αHαmKm
−αA (Lm +Km)1−αHαm
= (1− α)A (Lm +Km)−αHαmLm.
Since by (59) and (60)
Lm +Km
Hm
=
L+K
H
the ﬁrst identity in (57) follows. The second identity is proved
similarly. The other two identities follow directly from 56.
Since
Il = NlIl,i, Ic = NcIc,i, Iw = NwIw,i,
Ll = NlLl,i, K = NcKc,i, H = NwHw,i,
(20) follows from (57) with constants Cm, Cl, Cc and Cw
deﬁned by
Cm = (1− α)AHαLm, Cl = (1− α)AHαLl,
Cc = (1− α)AHα, Cw = αAHα.
(61)
We next give a justiﬁcation of (25). Assuming as in [12]
each individual in the society are identical in preference, which
is represented by the utility function
vi = (1− β) ln ci + β ln (z + bi)
where ci is the rate of consumption of individual i and bi is
the rate of the individual’s bequest for offspring, β ∈ (0, 1)
indicates the relative weight of bequest in utility, and z > 0
is a constant. The budget constraint 0 ≤ ci + bi ≤ Ii applies
where Ii is the individual’s instantaneous rate of income. It is
easy to see that the utility vi is maximized at
c∗i = Ii − β [Ii − Z]+ , b∗i = β [Ii − Z]+
where Z = (1− β) z/β. This proves (25).
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